Few history enthusiasts know much of a little island 45 miles long in the south Pacific called Biak. At a glance the battle seems like a lackluster performance of the 41st Infantry Division. A deeper look reveals something quite different. This little island was the scene of a tough battle whose publicity was supressed from the media by MacArthur for the sake of concealing his errors and his judgment. It seems MacArthur's competition with the Navy for preference in the Pacific Theatre was at stake. MacArthur feared that if Biak's battle planning and execution faults were discovered, his prestige would suffer, losing him public support in Washington. The battle was supposed to have been short, and result in the capture of three useful airfields for flying air support missions for the Navy's Marianas Campaign in the Central Pacific. Instead, failure by MacArthur to believe intelligence reports that 11,400 armed Japanese with at least a company of light tanks were stationed on Biak, created serious problems for the operation. This would cost a lot of lost time, and would created a dangerous situation for the Army assault troops employed. MacArthur chose to believe there were no more than 3,000 Japanese troops defending the island. He was also not concerned with the active Japanese shore battery emplacements near the landing site. These guns would be effective in harassing American ships, and naval support offshore. With this false assessment of the enemy's defenses, an inadequate sized force was allocated to the job.

MacArthur and 6th Army Commander, General Kreuger dispatched 2 regiments of the 41st Infantry Division to take the island by amphibious assault. The selected units were the 162nd, and 186th Regimental Combat Teams. The third regiment of the 41st Division, the 163rd, was still in the last stages of combat operations on the island of Wakde. If we make a comparison of this operation to others in the Pacific war, we can see that this operation was handicapped from the start. In all the other battles, American forces at least outnumbered the enemy by two to one in combat troops. Here, the assaulting troops were actually outnumbered themselves by the defending Japanese.

On May 27th the landings were made. They went badly, for an unforeseen ocean current had drifted the Navy vessels 1.5 miles to the west of their intended release points. Luckily for the assault troops, there was no Japanese defense on the beach. The 186th and 162nd regiments landed, but on the wrong sides of one another. As a result, the remainder of the day was spent redeploying correctly. Patrols were sent out, and the infantry began moving inland. No enemy resistance was encountered at first, giving General Fuller the false hope that the enemy had evacuated the island. As the soldiers moved into the hills and grasslands, they met the first Japanese resistance. The foundation of the Japanese force was the seasoned 222nd Infantry Regiment. A veteran from combat in China, and determined to fight to the last for the defense of the island. The Japanese were using high ground to accurately bombard the Americans advancing in the tall grass fields below. It was a certain disadvantage being in that tall grass. Counterbattery fire coordination was impossible without the American soldiers being able to see where the enemy was. Sorties by U.S. support aircraft surveyed the hills and identified some uncertain targets. Japanese camouflage and entrenchment was effective in concealing their positions.

The bombardment of the U.S. Army infantry was only a prelude to a strong enemy attack. The Japanese 222nd Regiment took advantage of its observation, to deploy around the American units. They first gained a flank, and then managed to surround the entire 3rd Battalion of the 162nd Inf Regiment. Surrounded, the American soldiers fought off at least three of these determined Japanese attacks that were supported by Type 95 light tanks. These enemy attacks were over battalion strength and made with fixed bayonets. Bravely, the combat veterans of New Guinea did not give ground or allow themselves to become disorganized. with help from a platoon of M-4 Shermans, all the enemy tanks were destroyed. the remainder of the Japanese force withdrew into the hills. Unfortunately despite the heroic defense, the American battalion suffered over 100 casualties. The 3rd battalion was ordered to fight its way back to friendly lines. The Sherman tanks provided an effective rear guard to the battalion's move into the 162nd Regiment.

As the Americans moved deeper inland, two problems arose. First it became clear that the enemy was not only in far greater strength and numbers than believed, but most of the enemy was systematically entrenched in the worst terrain on the island. Ridges, caves, thick jungle, and shear rock cliffs were occupied by thousands of Japanese troops. The second problem was that it was discovered that any little bit of fresh water on the island, was in enemy controlled areas. Therefore all vital drinking for the G.I's had to be unloaded and transported by hand over nearly impossible terrain to the front-line. A logistics nightmare of a vital provision. The run in with the aggressive enemy tank-infantry attacks and the cave defenses, General Fuller realized his predicament. He told General Krueger his superior that he needed more help with the size of the enemy on Biak, and that a lack of water for his men was hurting the effectiveness of his units. Krueger was being pressed by MacArthur for speed to acquiring the airfields. He sent the tired 163rd Regiment, only days out of battle on Wakde to reinforce Fullers force to a full division. When the 163rd Regiment arrived, the more weary units of the 163rd were initially used as a reserve, and security for the beach where supplies came in. The battle raged on, and not much difference had been made with the addition of the tired 163rd.

MacArthur wanted to know what was the cause for delay in securing Biak. He was already making false press statements about the progress in the battle. He stated the battle was almost over, when the 41st Division was just then realizing what they were up against. MacArthur sent an inspection team to Fuller's 41st Division to make an assessment of the division and General Fuller's leadership. The inspection team reached the front made its observations and returned with an interesting report. They told MacArthur that the division was over extended, facing a vastly larger force than anticipated, entrenched in the toughest terrain, and acutely short of water in the broiling heat. Inexplicably, Macarthur sent a second inspection team in and they returned with a completely different report. They stated that the 41st Division units were bunched up making dangerous targets for the enemy, not aggressively patrolling their lines, and that the higher ranking officers were not visiting and spurring aggression in their front line troops. Curiously, how can two inspection teams come up with contradictory reports on the same situation? It seems MacArthur had let be known what he wanted to hear in order to justify the relief of the 41st Division commander. He sacked General Fuller, and replaced him with his favored General Eichelberger to the post.

When Eichelberger arrived to visit the front, he found many of the same discoveries the 1st inspection team had made. He immediately decided to reorganize his lines by withdrawing some of the battalions slightly, allowing a pause in the battle, to allow a rest, and replenish water supplies. He also ordered the commitment of the 34th RCT from the 24th Infantry Division to land on Biak as a needed reinforcement. The rest, and reinforcements worked. The 41st Infantry division moved in with greater energy. They made an effort not to hit the enemy defenses head on, but to find defiles, and gaps to infiltrate past the teeth of the enemy's positions, and strike them from oblique, or from the side if possible. Landings of  small forces amphibiously further up the coast to bypass a Japanese position on land were also made. It was done very methodically and tactically. In comparison to the battles of the Central Pacific, with lighter much casualties.

The enemy had succeeded in sending reinforcements to Biak by sea. While most of the naval convoys were turned back by American air and sea intervention, at least an additional 2,000 Japanese troops arrived. Reguardless, by August the Japanese had been rooted out of the bunkers and cave defenses. All three airfields were taken and operational, although not in time to support the Marianas Operation. The Casualty figure for the U.S. at Biak stands at a total of 9,800. 2,400 were combat casualties, and the rest were from heat prostration, and illness to scrub typhus. Over 5,000 Japanese troops had been killed, and 800 were taken prisoner. Some Japanese troops refused to surrender, and during the battle escaped into the jungle where they continued to resist until January, 1945. Biak was an intense battle, fought in some of the most brutal terrain and enemy defenses of the Pacific theater. Despite a lack of water, the poor allocation of U.S. forces, and the large number of the enemy troops defending, the American soldiers acquitted themselves very well to achieve a clear victory, under terrible conditions. Little publicity went to the sacrifice and achievement at Biak because individuals of the high command did not want to publicize their own mistakes.